Coping with unpleasant surprises in a complex world: Is rational choice possible in a world with positive information costs?

This paper provides a rational choice-based analysis of the causes and consequences of surprise events. The paper argues that ignorance may be rational, but nonetheless produce systematic mistakes, inconsistent behavior, and both pleasant and unpleasant surprises. If ignorance and unpleasant surprises are commonplace and relevant for individual and group decisionmaking, we should observe standing institutions for dealing with them - and we do. Insofar as surprises are consistent with rational choice models, but left outside most models, it can be argued that these methodological choices mistakenly limit the scope of rational choicebased research. --Ignorance,Rational Ignorance,Natural Ignorance,Bounded Rationality,Rational Choice,Biased Expectations,Crisis Management,Social Insurance,Bailouts,Economics of Information

Democracy in America: Labour Mobility, Ideology , and Constitutional Reform

Constitutional democracy in the United States emerged very gradually through a long series of constitutional bargains in the course of three centuries. No revolutions or revolutionary threats were necessary or evident during most of the three century–long transition to constitutional democracy in America. As in Europe, legislative authority gradually increased, wealth-based suffrage laws were gradually eliminated, the secret ballot was introduced, and the power of elected officials increased. For the most part, this occurred peacefully and lawfully, with few instances of open warfare or revolutionary threats. A theory of constitutional exchange grounded in rational choice models provides a good explanation for the distinctive features of American constitutional history, as it does for much of the West, although it does less well at explaining the timing of some changes

Voter discernment and candidate entry in pluralitarian election

The paper develops a sequential model of candidate entry into elections decided on the basis of plurality. We analyze the kinds of candidates who are most likely to enter elections and simulate several plausible myopic entry sequences under various assumptions about voter abilities to discern differences in candidate positions. In the cases examined, open elections for “important” positions attract the entry of more than two candidates. Moreover, myopic entry often generates electoral outcomes which depart from the median-mean outcomes of the conventional models. These results are consistent with the observed diversity of candidates in presidential and other significant primary elections which contrasts with many previous analyses of electoral entry

A Test of the Institutionally Induced Equilibrium Hypothesis: On the Limited Fiscal Impact of Two Celebrity Governors

We test for the stabilizing effects of political institutions on fiscal policies by examining the impact of two unlikely governors on their state’s fiscal policies. Fiscal policies are joint products of executive and legislative decisions. These institutional factors tend to moderate the effect of changes in the chief executive, as does partisan competition for office. Jesse Ventura of Minnesota’s and Arnold Schwarzenegger of California were unique—surprise—governors of their respective states. Although both governors were arguably less constrained by partisan loyalties than most others, the other institutional factors would still tend to limit their impact on public policy. Our evidence suggests that in spite of their unique path to office neither governor had a significant impact on their state’s expenditures or deficits

2010,09: On the evolution of organizational government

This paper analyzes the design, refinement, and evolution of organizational policymaking processes, that is to say, organizational governance. Governance procedures like other aspects of organization are refined through time to advance formeteur interests. Several mechanisms of evolution are explored in this paper. First, formal organizations have a beginning. They are founded. As a consequence, governance templates initially tend to maximize formeteur control over their organizations. Second, formeteurs may subsequently revise the initial distribution of authority. There are often good reasons for formeteurs to exchange some of their initial authority for services and resources that advance organizational interests. Third, there are the constraints of survivorship, which require an organization to attract sufficient resources to be self sustaining. This paper suggests that the results of these processes of refinement tend to be ruledriven, divided governments, many of which will be based on the king and council template. That template facilitates the emergence of relatively effective forms of organizational governance, because it can be adjusted at a large number of margins without changing the essential architecture of governance

2010,09: On the evolution of organizational government

This paper analyzes the design, refinement, and evolution of organizational policymaking processes, that is to say, organizational governance. Governance procedures like other aspects of organization are refined through time to advance formeteur interests. Several mechanisms of evolution are explored in this paper. First, formal organizations have a beginning. They are founded. As a consequence, governance templates initially tend to maximize formeteur control over their organizations. Second, formeteurs may subsequently revise the initial distribution of authority. There are often good reasons for formeteurs to exchange some of their initial authority for services and resources that advance organizational interests. Third, there are the constraints of survivorship, which require an organization to attract sufficient resources to be self sustaining. This paper suggests that the results of these processes of refinement tend to be ruledriven, divided governments, many of which will be based on the king and council template. That template facilitates the emergence of relatively effective forms of organizational governance, because it can be adjusted at a large number of margins without changing the essential architecture of governance

In Defense of Ignorance: On the Significance of a Neglected Form of Incomplete Information

Many contemporary theorists have stressed the importance of imperfect information for rational choice. However, they have not generally distinguished between two quite different notions of imperfect information. This paper compares and contrasts the search and ignorance conceptions of imperfect information, noting differences in their implications for market activity, welfare economics, and for the accumulation of knowledge. The analysis suggests that conventional probabilistic characterization of imperfect information can not fully capture the effects of imperfect knowledge on rational decision making nor on market activity. Ignorance must also be taken account of.Information

Induced pseudoscalar coupling of the proton weak interaction

The induced pseudoscalar coupling $g_p$ is the least well known of the weak coupling constants of the proton's charged--current interaction. Its size is dictated by chiral symmetry arguments, and its measurement represents an important test of quantum chromodynamics at low energies. During the past decade a large body of new data relevant to the coupling $g_p$ has been accumulated. This data includes measurements of radiative and non radiative muon capture on targets ranging from hydrogen and few--nucleon systems to complex nuclei. Herein the authors review the theoretical underpinnings of $g_p$, the experimental studies of $g_p$, and the procedures and uncertainties in extracting the coupling from data. Current puzzles are highlighted and future opportunities are discussed.Comment: 58 pages, Latex, Revtex4, prepared for Reviews of Modern Physic